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Whether young children understand that others may hold false beliefs is a hotly debated topic in 
psychology and neuroscience. Much evidence suggests that children do not pass this milestone 
in their understanding of other people until the age of 5 years. Other evidence suggests that 
they understand already in their second year. This study proposes a novel account of the logic 
of conversations about certain mental states. By modifying the discourse accordingly, children 
passed three false belief tasks at 3 years of age while they failed standard false belief tasks. 
The results support the view that even young children construe other people in adult-like 
psychological terms.
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may provide the best information. With regard to object identity, 
this could be appearance, e.g., “What is this?” “-It looks like an 
apple” (Austin, 1962). With regard to location, it could be where a 
third, absent, person thinks the object is, e.g., “Where is the choco-
late?” “-Jill thinks it is in the refrigerator” (Willet, 1988).
It follows that the question, “Where does Jill think the chocolate 
is?” could be interpreted as a request for indirect knowledge about 
the actual location of the chocolate in certain contexts, rather than 
always being a unique request for Jill’s belief. If children make this 
interpretation on false belief tasks, everyday conversational logic 
directs them to respond with the true location rather than with 
Jill’s false belief. They will then fail the tasks irrespective of their 
understanding of false belief.
Consider a starker example. A firefighter arrives on the scene of 
a smoking building and asks an office worker, “Where does your 
manager think the fire is?” This is a plausible way to obtain indirect 
knowledge about the location of a fire. Crucially, answering such 
a request is an unremarkable event when neither the first person 
(the firefighter) nor the second person (the worker) knows the loca-
tion of the fire. But when the second person knows better than the 
absent, third person (the manager), everyday conversational logic 
complicates the answer. Suppose the worker knows that the fire 
is in fact in the basement, even though his manager believes that 
it is in the kitchen. Though a literally correct answer, it would be 
uncooperative and even misleading of the worker to answer, “My 
manager thinks the fire is in the kitchen.”
Suppose the firefighter instead arrived on the scene and asked, 
“Where will your manager look for the fire?” This is another plausi-
ble way to request the likely true location of the fire, if the firefighter 
also here assumes that the office worker does not know from per-
sonal experience. The worker could give the literal answer, “In the 
kitchen.” But if he knows that the fire is in the basement, he would 
have sent the firefighter to the wrong place. Because people’s actions 
reflect their thoughts, an action question can function pragmati-
cally as a belief question.
IntroductIon
Children’s understanding that people may hold and act on false 
beliefs, such as looking for the keys in the wrong place, is a mile-
stone in their development towards an adult-like theory-of-mind. 
To attribute a false belief to someone, children must understand 
that there can be representations of the world that differ from 
their own accurate understanding (Dennett, 1978). Thus, false 
belief tasks are benchmarks of children’s acquisition of a repre-
sentational theory-of-mind, without which they are left unable to 
understand mistaken expectations, misguided actions, or mislead-
ing appearances.
On a typical false belief task, children are asked to predict where 
a puppet, Jill, thinks her chocolate is. The chocolate has been sur-
reptitiously moved from where Jill originally put it, creating a false 
belief. A typical question could be, “Where does Jill think the choco-
late is?” The correct answer is that Jill thinks the chocolate is in 
the original location. Yet children below 4½ years typically answer 
that Jill thinks that the chocolate is in the new and actual location 
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983).
Children’s failure is striking because children actually remember 
the crucial pieces of information, i.e., they know where Jill put the 
chocolate and that she did not see it being moved. Even more striking 
is that children as young as 15 months reveal a tacit understanding 
of false belief on new nonverbal tasks (Clements and Perner, 1994; 
Garnham and Ruffman, 2001; Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005).
Nevertheless, overwhelming confirmation of the original results 
in hundreds of false belief studies across many cultures and lan-
guages has generally led to the conclusion that children do not 
develop the cognitive foundation required to understand men-
tal representation until their fifth year (Perner, 1991; Gopnik and 
Wellman, 1994; Wellman et al., 2001).
I propose an alternative account based on the conversational 
logic involved in talking about certain mental states. In certain 
contexts, two speakers may not have direct knowledge about the 
identity or the location of an object. Instead, indirect knowledge 
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implicatures, about a speaker’s meaning based on the assump-
tion that speakers adhere to four maxims that prescribe how to 
communicate most efficiently and rationally. The maxims belong 
to a general cooperative principle, under which people recog-
nize a common purpose of a conversation and match answers 
to requests.
Reporting beliefs as indirect knowledge is mainly regulated 
by the Maxim of Quantity: Make a contribution no more or no 
less informative than required. In the exchange, “Son, where are 
the keys?” “-Well, Mom thinks they are in the cabinet,” the son’s 
seemingly irrelevant answer is nevertheless intelligible because 
people may infer that he cooperates with the request, but even at 
his most informative can only provide indirect knowledge about 
the location.
The maxim also constrains the son’s answer. Suppose he knows 
that the keys are on the table but that his mother falsely thinks they 
are in the cabinet. He would be literally correct in saying, “Mom 
thinks the keys are in the cabinet.” But this information would be 
superfluous and therefore uncooperative. People’s false beliefs are 
uninformative when the common purpose of the conversation is 
to discover the true location.
The analysis applies to false belief tasks. Suppose young children 
presume the ordinary context of lack of knowledge about reality 
on the part of the experimenter, in the sense of, “(I’m looking for 
the chocolate and I assume you don’t know from personal experi-
ence.) Where does Jill think the chocolate is?” The question then 
implies that the experimenter seeks indirect information about 
the likely location third-hand, through Jill’s belief. But the point 
of the false belief task is that children know better than Jill. So if 
they wish to cooperate with the presumed request for the likely 
location and avoid violating the maxim of quantity, children must 
skip the uninformative step of Jill’s false belief and respond with 
reality. Conversational logic compels children to say the truth if 
they know it, and leads them to fail the tasks.
To pass false belief tasks, then, children must presume the 
conditional context. In this context, it would violate the maxim 
of quantity to interpret the test question as a request for indirect 
knowledge about the likely location because both experimenter 
and child already know it.
It can be argued that children should already be aware of the 
conditional context. After all, the child and the experimenter 
jointly witnessed that the object was transferred to a new loca-
tion. However, children may interpret the test question locally and 
invoke the ordinary context for several reasons.
First, the pragmatic implication of asking an honest question 
is lack of knowledge on the part of the experimenter, which for 
young children may override any shared knowledge and indicate 
the ordinary context. According to a related view (e.g., Siegal 
and Peterson, 1994), young children have yet to fully under-
stand the conversational requirements of “academic” question-
ing where the questioner already knows the answer. The current 
discourse-based account explicates the conversational logic of 
certain mental-state expressions which is a novel extension of 
this more general view.
Second, the shell game-like atmosphere of the false belief task, 
in particular the location task, may suggest to young children that 
the context remains one of following the ball. A major challenge 
While the context in the firefighter example is clearly different 
from that of a false belief task, the point is to illustrate that situations 
exist where the question, “Where does X think Y is,” is not meant 
to include, or is interpreted as including, somebody’s false belief. 
Rather, it requests likely reality. For a variety of reasons, young 
children may not be sufficiently sensitive to the context to invoke 
precisely the meaning that is the premise of the false belief task. 
Thus, the current study experimentally manipulates the conversa-
tional context so that it is less equivocal to young children.
Requests for indirect knowledge are common and diverse. People 
must often solicit absent people’s knowledge to learn about the 
world on the assumption that none of the present speakers knows 
the truth from personal experience, e.g., “What would Piaget say?” 
They are also likely to be familiar to children, e.g., “Please go ask 
your Mom where the keys are,” or, “Does your Mom know where 
the keys are?” The same conversational logic applies here. To illus-
trate, a child would not reply that his mother said that the keys 
are in the kitchen if the child knows that they are in the base-
ment. Or to the latter question solely give the literal answer, “No,” 
if the child knows better than his mother. Such answers would 
be considered uncooperative, jocular, or a sign of undeveloped 
pragmatic understanding.
A request for indirect knowledge may simultaneously consti-
tute an indirect request. A classic example of an indirect request is 
asking someone if she can pass the salt. The point is normally not 
to inquire about the respondent’s physical ability, but to actually 
request the salt (e.g., Searle, 1975). In a similar vein, the child in 
the preceding two examples is not directly requested to report his 
mother’s belief about the location of the keys, but most listeners 
would nevertheless interpret the questions in this way. However, the 
focus of this paper is not on indirect requests in Searle’s sense but 
on the conversational logic of requests for indirect knowledge, such 
as asking about appearances as a path to the identity of an object 
or requesting someone’s belief about the location of an object as a 
path to its actual location.
The analysis rests on two interrelated insights into language use 
from the field of psycholinguistics. First, interpreting a belief ques-
tion as a request for indirect knowledge requires the assumption 
that the questioner lacks knowledge. Any conversational context 
partly consists of a set of assumptions about the other speakers’ 
state of knowledge, termed the common ground (Stalnaker, 1978). 
At any point in a conversation, the common ground may determine 
the interpretation of new statements. Lack of knowledge about a 
location may be indicated explicitly, e.g., verbally with questions 
such as, “Where are the keys,” or nonverbally by searching. It may 
also be assumed implicitly by the listener (Clark et al., 1983). I will 
consider it the ordinary context because it depends on the least 
number of conditionals.
In contrast, consider a context with two people staring at some 
keys. Here it would be redundant to interpret the question, “Where 
does Jill think the keys are?” as a request for indirect knowledge 
because the location is already known. I will call this the conditional 
context because it depends on shared knowledge.
Second, certain answers will be deemed uncooperative if they 
do not fulfill the intended meaning with the request. This is 
captured by Grice’s account of everyday conversational logic 
(Grice, 1975). People make inferences, termed conversational 
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Similarly to the false belief task, the key test question, “What 
does this look like?” may be interpreted as a request for indirect 
knowledge about object identity in an ordinary context, e.g., “What 
is this?” “-Well, what does it look like?” (Austin, 1962). As the answer 
to the last question will provide indirect knowledge about the iden-
tity, it is subject to the conversational logic outlined above. For 
deceptive objects, answering with appearance would be superfluous 
because appearance is not a clue to their identity. It would violate 
the maxim of quantity.
To pass appearance-reality tasks, children must understand 
that the test question is embedded in the conditional context that 
both speakers already share knowledge of the identity of the object, 
which frees the child to answer with appearance. On three appear-
ance-reality tasks that emphasized the conditional context, even 
3-year-old children gave nearly all-correct appearance responses 
while they failed the standard versions of the tasks (Hansen and 
Markman, 2005).
Young children should be similarly successful on false belief 
tasks that emphasize the conditional context. This would be strong 
evidence that children’s problems with theory-of-mind tasks are 
due to difficulties with talking about mental states rather than with 
understanding the mind.
This hypothesis was tested on three major false belief tasks: 
(1) A location false belief task; (2) a contents false belief task; 
and (3) a representational change false belief task. On all tasks, 
the shared knowledge was emphasized in connection with the 
test question by simply restating it, e.g., “You and I know that the 
chocolate is in the basket, where does Jill think it is?” Compared 
to standard versions of each task, young children should do better 
in the emphasized context condition and thus demonstrate their 
knowledge of false belief.
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
Participants were 73 preschoolers from Sydney, Australia (mean: 
3 years and 11 months, range: 3 years and 5 months to 4 years and 
7 months). There were 34 boys and 39 girls, all English-speaking 
and primarily of Caucasian, middle socio-economic background. 
All participated in two conditions, except 11 children who only 
participated in one condition to complete the design.
The research was carried out in accordance with the ethi-
cal standards of the American Psychological Association for the 
treatment of research participants. Assent from the children was 
obtained prior to their participation. Sydney University’s Human 
Research Ethics Committee approved the experiments.
desIgn and MaterIals
There were three types of false belief tasks: location (n = 54), con-
tents (n = 36), and representational change (n = 45). Each type of 
task had three conditions with equal numbers of participants in 
each: standard, emphasized context, and frame control. Each condi-
tion contained two similar scenarios acted out by the experimenter 
with various dolls and containers. Because of the relative similarity 
of tasks, conditions, and scenarios, children did not participate in 
all three types of tasks or all three types of conditions. Each child 
participated in two different types of tasks with an unrelated dis-
tractor task in between, and only in one of the conditions from 
for researchers, then, is to design false belief tasks that block the 
possibility of presuming the local, ordinary context by clearly link-
ing the test question to the preceding discourse.
Some related accounts that integrate the concept of common 
ground and the Gricean maxims to explain certain mental-state 
verbs can be found in the linguistic and philosophical literature. 
They are based on an original proposition by Kiparsky and Kiparsky 
(1970). These authors proposed categorizing cognitive verbs which 
take that complements into two broad categories. Factives are verbs 
where the complement can be presupposed to be true, e.g., know 
and forget, as in “John knows that it is raining.” Non-factives are 
verbs where there is no presupposition as to whether the comple-
ment is true or not, e.g., think, believe, and say, as in, “John thinks 
that it is raining.”
Kempson (1975) pointed out that for factive verbs the impli-
cation of truth of the complement does not necessarily hold. 
Her analysis of factivity based on the Gricean maxims and the 
concept of common ground showed that the implication of 
truth of the complement is context-dependent rather than a 
semantic property of the sentence in question. Conversely, in 
the case of non-factive verbs, Karttunen (1973) points out that 
non-factives such as say can in fact function as factives under 
certain conditions.
While these proposals support the context-dependent aspects 
of the discourse-based account in a general manner, it is impor-
tant to note that to date, the fields of linguistics and philosophy 
are grappling with the issue of factivity. Numerous authors have 
identified flaws in the original semantic and logical explanations 
of the Kiparskys’ proposal and have criticized the accuracy and 
scope of the distinction itself (for an overview, see Hazlett, 2010). 
Some authors instead favor a Gricean account like that of Kempson 
(e.g., Karttunen, 1998; Stalnaker, 1998; Hazlett, 2010). However, the 
versions of the factivity theory that include a Gricean analysis are 
presently too narrow to account for our phenomenon of interest. 
To properly cover children’s understanding of the test questions on 
a variety of theory-of-mind tasks, such an account must not only 
include mental-state verbs that take that complements, but all types 
of expressions used on false belief tasks and appearance-reality tasks 
such as thinks, says, looks for, and looks like.
From a developmental point of view, Abbeduto and Rosenberg 
(1985) conducted the most extensive study based on the Kiparskys’ 
proposal. They showed that before the age of 4 years, children treat 
non-factives as factives. The results confirm that the interpreta-
tion of thinks and believes may be difficult for 3-year-olds under 
circumstances other than the false belief task, but the study is nev-
ertheless of limited relevance to the current account. The authors 
acknowledged the pragmatic weaknesses of the Kiparskys’ original 
analysis but opted for ignoring them, thus not allowing a com-
parison with the broader view of the conversational context that 
is presented here.
The discourse-based account receives empirical support from its 
application to another major theory-of-mind task: the appearance-
reality task. On this task children are introduced to a deceptive 
object, such as a sponge that looks like a rock. At test, children below 
4½ years of age typically fail, strikingly saying that the object not 
only is a sponge but also looks like a sponge. This suggests that they 
cannot distinguish appearances from reality (Flavell et al., 1986).
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then opened the box and discovered that it contained crayons. 
The experimenter closed the box and introduced the character 
Dorothy, explaining that Dorothy had never looked inside the box 
before. Children in the standard condition were asked, “What does 
Dorothy think is inside the box?” Children typically fail answering 
“crayons” rather than “band-aids,” seemingly unaware of Dorothy’s 
false belief. Children in the emphasized context condition were asked, 
“You and I know that there are crayons inside, what does Dorothy 
think is inside the box?”
The frame control condition did not include false belief: Dorothy 
inspected the box with the lid open, so she could see the true con-
tents. Children were then asked, “Dorothy thinks there are crayons 
in the box, what do you and I know is inside?” The correct answer 
was the same contents as mentioned in the test question, i.e., cray-
ons. If children were guided by an “opposites” strategy, they should 
choose the other possible answer, i.e., band-aids.
Task 3 was a representational change false belief task (Gopnik 
and Astington, 1988). The task is based on the contents false belief 
task but rather than reporting someone else’s false belief, this type 
of task requires children to report their own previous false belief. 
The introduction is the same as in the previous task, but after the 
experimenter closes the band-aid box, children in the standard 
condition are asked, “What did you think was in the box before you 
opened it?” Children typically fail by answering “crayons,” seem-
ingly unaware of their own previous false belief.
On a discourse-based account, a question about someone’s 
past belief can be interpreted as a request for indirect knowl-
edge. Consider the example of a judge asking a police officer, 
“We have to find the money. Where did you think it was?” If 
the police officer knows better than she previously did, it would 
be uncooperative of her to just report her previous belief and 
withhold the truth.
To ensure that children did not misread the context as one of 
searching for indirect knowledge in the way of a past, but presum-
ably still valid, belief, children in the emphasized context condition 
were therefore asked, “You and I know there are crayons inside, 
what did you think was in the box before you opened it?”
In the frame control condition, children initially saw the band-
aid box with the lid open and were asked, “What do you think is 
inside the box?” All answered, “crayons.” The box was closed, and 
children were asked, “Before you thought there were crayons inside 
the box, what do you and I know is inside?” Since the child had 
seen the actual contents, there was no false belief and the correct 
answer was the same contents as mentioned in the test question, 
i.e., crayons. But if children were guided by an “opposites” strategy, 
they should not say crayons.
results
Children’s responses to the test questions in Task 1 to 3 were scored 
online by the experimenter as correct or incorrect. The analyses 
were done on the number of correct answers. Because there were 
two scenarios within each condition, the maximum number of 
correct answers in each condition is 2. Table 1 presents the data. 
Preliminary analyses showed no effects of task, order, gender, or age 
(split at mean age). As predicted, children’s performance improved 
significantly on all three tasks when the conversational context of 
the test question was made clear.
each task, with the constraint the conditions were not the same. The 
combination of tasks and conditions was specified on six lists that 
were cycled through. This yielded a sufficiently counter-balanced 
pattern of the types of tasks, types of conditions, scenarios, and their 
respective orders. For example, a child might participate in a block 
of two similar scenarios of the standard condition of the location 
task, then receive a distractor task, and then participate in a block 
of two similar scenarios of the emphasized context condition of 
the contents task. Each child was seen individually in a quiet area 
of the preschool.
Procedure
One scenario will be described for each task. Task 1 was a location 
false belief task. Elmo played with a ball in front of three cups. While 
holding the ball, he then turned all three cups upside-down and hid 
the ball in one of them, and then left the stage. Big Bird now sur-
reptitiously moved the ball to another cup. The experimenter then 
explained that Elmo wanted to play with the ball again. Children 
in the standard condition were asked, “Where does Elmo think the 
ball is?” Children in the emphasized context condition were asked, 
“You and I know that the ball is in the <color of> cup, where does 
Elmo think it is?”
It is conceivable that the question frame itself invited children 
to use a low-level “opposites” strategy in the emphasized context 
condition such as, “You say one thing, so I say the other.” This 
tendency might be enhanced by the fact that the two mental-state 
words think and know may be somewhat difficult to distinguish for 
children of 3 to 5 years of age (for a review, see Papafragou et al., 
2007). Therefore, the location task included three locations, so even 
if children keyed off the location mentioned in the question, they 
could not use this information to select between the remaining 
two answers.
Additionally, a frame control condition was designed to control 
for this possibility. Children saw Elmo turn over the three cups 
while holding the ball, hide the ball in one cup, go outside and 
play, and return to find the ball. As Elmo returned, children were 
asked: “Elmo thinks the ball is in the yellow cup, where do you and 
I know it is?” As there was only a true belief, the correct answer was 
the same location as in the question, i.e., the yellow cup.
Because the phenomenon under investigation is contrastive, a 
control condition using exactly the same contrastive frame as the 
emphasized context condition but calling for a non-contrastive 
answer would be pragmatically infelicitous. Asking with a contrast 
where none can be found, for example in the case of a true belief 
setup, would not lead to a clear prediction for children’s answers. 
Recall that on the discourse-based explanation, stating what some-
body knows has implications for how to interpret the following 
think. However, the reverse should not be true so the solution was 
to simply reverse the order of these mental-state words in the test 
question of the frame control condition. If children were using an 
“opposites” strategy, blindly keying off the option mentioned in 
the test question in combination with uncertainty about the exact 
meaning of the mental-state words, they should tend to choose the 
incorrect answer options.
Task 2 was a contents false belief task (Hogrefe et al., 1986). 
Children were shown a band-aid box and asked, “What do you think 
is inside this box?” Most children answered band-aids. Children 
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not just two but three answer options, between which children 
still choose correctly. Furthermore, on all three tasks children 
gave an average of 36% incorrect answers in the enhanced context 
condition which they would be unlikely to do on an automatic 
opposites interpretation.
dIscussIon
Standard false belief tasks may mislead young children because 
questions about other people’s thoughts on reality (including 
their intended actions which reflect their thoughts) are a perfectly 
fine way to obtain indirect knowledge about reality in certain 
contexts such as the ordinary context, e.g., “I’m looking for the 
chocolate. Where does your Mom think it is?” Such questions 
require answering with the truth, not beliefs known to be false. 
If children assume the ordinary context on the false belief task, 
it places them in a pragmatic bind because they know the truth 
about the location better than the absent, third person. It would 
be awkward not to say the truth, so young children do, and fail 
the standard task.
Young children may assume the ordinary context, perhaps 
even by default, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the 
test question expresses ignorance on the part of the experimenter 
if interpreted as an honest question, which young children have 
been argued to do on a number of standard developmental 
tasks (e.g., Siegal and Peterson, 1994). The perception of an 
honest question indicates the ordinary context rather than the 
conditional context. Second, the ordinary context of looking 
for knowledge about reality is supported by the follow-the-ball 
atmosphere of the test scenario, especially in the case of the 
location false belief task. Finally, the ordinary context depends 
on fewer inferences.
The analysis of the discourse of the false belief task suggested 
that interpreting the test question as it is meant requires complex 
pragmatic inferences. Crucially, children must consider how the 
state of mind of the experimenter is factored into the discourse. 
In order to understand the test question correctly, children must 
integrate into their interpretation that the experimenter already 
knows the location, here called the conditional context. He can 
therefore not intend to gain indirect knowledge about it from the 
child, because it would violate normal rules of conversation to ask 
about something he already knows.
To help young children achieve better integration of the dis-
course of the false belief task, the experimenter in the present study 
clearly stated that he was already aware of the location as part of 
the test question. With this slight modification to the discourse, 
3-year-olds were able to pass three false belief tasks, while failing 
the standard versions. Because the intervention was minimal–no 
new information was added and the structure of the task was 
unchanged–these results are quite strong evidence that contrary to 
current theories (e.g., Perner, 1991; Gopnik and Wellman, 1994), 
at least older 3-year-olds have the cognitive foundation needed 
to understand beliefs, which is being masked by the standard 
false belief tasks because they rely on context-dependent mental-
state verbs.
In contrast, clearly non-reality-based mental-state verbs such as 
pretend, dream, and fantasize do not semantically lend themselves 
to interpretations as requests for indirect knowledge (see Morgan, 
On the location false belief task, children in the emphasized 
context condition gave 1.17 correct answers (59%) compared to 
0.44 correct answers (22%) in the standard condition, t(34) = 2.43, 
p = 0.02. Even under the complex verbal circumstances in the 
emphasized context condition, children performed better than 
chance, set at 33%, t(17) = 2.18, p = 0.04.
On the contents and representational change false belief tasks, 
children in the emphasized context condition gave 1.25 (63%) and 
1.40 (70%) correct answers, respectively, compared to 0.08 (4%) 
and 0.40 (20%), respectively, in the standard condition. Both dif-
ferences were significant at t(22) = 4.01, p = 0.001 and t(28) = 3.49, 
p = 0.002, respectively.
Children’s performance in the emphasized context condition 
was better than chance, set at 50%, on the representational change 
task, t-one-tailed(14) = 1.87, p = 0.04, but not on the contents false 
belief task. This may be due to the fact that children’s performance 
in the standard conditions of these two tasks was already low. It was 
below chance, t(14) = 3.15, p = 0.007, and t(11) = 11.00, p = 0.001, 
respectively, which was not the case for the location false belief task. 
Additionally, correct performance in the standard condition of all 
three tasks was generally on the low side of the average propor-
tion of correct answers in Wellman et al. (2001) meta-analysis of 
hundreds of false belief conditions. Children’s performance nev-
ertheless fell within the range of the results that were included in 
the meta-analysis. Overall, it is impressive that younger children 
performed better than the standard condition on all three tasks and 
above chance on two of the three tasks (location and representa-
tional change), given the minimal modifications to the inherently 
pragmatically infelicitous standard tasks.
Despite there being only two answer options on the contents 
and representational change tasks, children’s performance is likely 
not attributable to a low-level “opposites” strategy. This is partly 
because children nearly aced the control condition at an average 
of 1.84 correct answers out of 2 across the three tasks, despite a 
question frame that might plausibly elicit an “opposites” answer. 
In planned contrasts, this differed significantly from the above-
mentioned chance levels for each task, t(42) = 24.92, p = 0.001. 
Thus, children are likely not guided by a conceivable tendency to 
automatically choose the opposite answer of the one mentioned 
in the test question. However, the frame control condition was not 
intended to stand alone but to be considered within the overall 
pattern of results. The quite similar location false belief task had 
Table 1 | Mean number of correct answers out of 2 to test questions in 
task 1 to 3.
 Condition
 Standard Emphasized Frame 
  context  control
Type of task Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1. False location (n = 54) 0.44 0.78 1.17 0.99 1.94 0.24
2. False contents (n = 36) 0.08 0.29 1.25 0.97 1.92 0.29
3.  Representational 0.40 0.74 1.40 0.83 1.67 0.72 
change (n = 45)
Frontiers in Psychology | Developmental Psychology  July 2010 | Volume 1 | Article 23 | 6
Hansen False belief
tational change and its relation to the 
understanding of false belief and the 
appearance-reality distinction. Child 
Dev. 59, 26–37.
Gopnik, A., and Wellman, H. M. (1994). 
“The ‘theory’ theory.” in Mapping the 
Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition 
and Culture, eds L. Hirschfeld and 
S. Gelman (New York: Cambridge 
University Press), 257–293.
Grice, H. P. (1975). “Logic and conver-
sation (from the William James lec-
tures, Harvard University, 1967),” in 
Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, 
eds P. Cole and J. Morgan (New York: 
Academic Press), 41–58.
Hansen, M. B., and Markman, E. M. 
(2005). Appearance questions can 
be misleading: a discourse-based 
account of the appearance real-
ity problem. Cogn. Psychol. 50, 
233–263.
about the apparent-real and pretend-
real distinctions. Dev. Psychol. 23, 
816–822.
Flavell, J. H., Green, F. L., and Flavell, E. 
R. (1986). Development of knowledge 
about the appearance-reality distinc-
tion. Monogr. Soc. Res. Child Dev. 51.
Frye, D., Zelazo, P. D., and Palfai, T. (1995). 
Theory of mind and rule-based rea-
soning. Cogn. Dev. 10, 483–527.
Garnham, W. A., and Ruffman, T. 
(2001). Doesn’t see, doesn’t know: 
is anticipatory looking really related 
to understanding of belief? Dev. Sci. 
4, 94–100.
German, T. P., and Leslie, A. M. (2000). 
“Attending to and learning about men-
tal states,” in Children’s Reasoning and 
the Mind, eds P. Mitchell and K. Riggs 
(Hove: Psychology Press), 229–252.
Gopnik, A., and Astington, J. W. (1988). 
Children’s understanding of represen-
Bacharach, V. R., and Luszcz, M. A. (1979). 
Communicative competence in young 
children: the use of implicit linguistic 
information. Child Dev. 50, 260–263.
Carlson, S. M., and Moses, L. J. (2001). 
Individual differences in inhibitory 
control and children’s theory of mind. 
Child Dev. 72, 1032–1053.
Clark, H. H., Schreuder, R., and Buttrick, 
S. (1983). Common ground and the 
understanding of demonstrative ref-
erence. J. verbal Learn. Verbal Behav. 
22, 245–258.
Clements, W. A., and Perner, J. (1994). 
Implicit understanding of belief. Cogn. 
Dev. 9 377–395.
Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brainstorms: 
Philosophical Essays on Mind and 
Psychology . Montgomery, VT: 
Bradford Books.
Flavell, J. H., Flavell, E. R., and Green, F. 
L. (1987). Young children’s knowledge 
references
Abbeduto, L., and Rosenberg, S. (1985). 
Children’s knowledge of the pre-
suppositions of know and other 
cognitive verbs. J. Child Lang. 12, 
621–641.
Allen, R. (1991). Integration of communi-
cational cues by very young children. J. 
Psycholinguist. Res. 20, 389–402.
Andrews, G., Halford, G. S., Bunch, K. 
M., Bowden, D., and Jones, T. (2003). 
Theory of mind and relational com-
plexity. Child Dev. 74, 1476–1499.
Austin, J. L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Avrutin, S., and Coopmans, P. (2000). 
“Children who build bridges,” in 
Proceedings of the 24th Annual Boston 
University Conference on Language 
Development, eds S. C. Howell, S. A. 
Fish, and T. Keith-Lucas (Somerville, 
MA: Cascadilla Press), 80–91.
Another set of studies investigated whether children used the 
implicit pragmatic suggestions of the discourse setting to infer 
the topic of a conversation (Shatz, 1978; Bacharach and Luszcz, 
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